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Arguments suggesting that the apparent exquisite appropriateness of the
cosmos for intelligent life is a result of deliberate design have long been
familiar. But whereas many historical attempts to establish design are
perceived as having seriously eroded over time, cosmic fine-tuning argu-
ments have if anything gained ground from recent discoveries both of
the sheer number of apparently independent crucial parameters2 requir-
ing ‘tuning’ and of the unforgiving narrowness of the workable ranges of
those parameters.
The ground apparently gained by such arguments has been substantial
enough to make attractive, if not actually to prompt and motivate, a specif-
ic type of cosmological theory — many-universe theories — whose per-
ceived attractions are not exclusively empirical and predictive, but include
their apparent ability to undercut fine-tuning inferences to design. What I
wish to do in the following is to investigate the structure and presupposi-
tions of one class of proposed design-stifling arguments, and see both how
they are supposed to work and whether or not they actually do work as
advertised.
I. Design
In most sweepingly general terms, to be designed is to be a product of
deliberate intent. Correlatively, to appear designed is to resonate in some
hard-to-specify way with mind— to have properties one might reasonably
expect from (or explain in terms of) deliberate intention. Of course, these
grossly general intuitions demand an absolute thicket of qualifications and




Multiple-universe theories (involving the saturation of a state space of alterna-
tive universes) enjoy growing popularity as proposed counters to the design-
suggestiveness of increasingly impressive cosmic fine-tuning cases. In this
paper I explore this type of counter, and argue that (i) multiple-universe theo-
ries do not necessarily undercut the design relevance of cosmic fine-tuning,
that (ii) both the required saturation and the hypothesized mechanisms sup-
posed to generate such saturation face seriously non-trivial constraints, and
that (iii) in some cases the specific characteristics of such saturations may
themselves be suggestive of design.
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 22 No. 5 Special Issue 2005
All rights reserved
with cognition is nearly always the ultimate signature of design. In more
graphic terms, good design involves occupying some peak (or near peak)
on an appropriate state space, where the identification of ‘appropriate’ has
essential reference to mind, intent, and value. In identifying something as
deliberately designed, or in identifying a state space peak, there is an
undertone of that locale being picked out from among alternatives in the
background topography.
How does this relate to contemporary cosmology? So far as is known,
there is apparently an enormous range of ways that universes could be
constructed and run — a huge state space of possible universes.
Furthermore, it seems increasingly clear that only a miniscule fraction of
those variant structures would permit life — and intelligent life — to
emerge, to exist, or to persist, let alone to thrive. Our universe obviously
falls among that miniscule fraction — it appears to be exquisitely adjusted,
or ‘fine tuned,’ for life. In state space terms, our cosmos seems to sit on a
delicate peak in a vast, otherwise largely barren cosmological state space.
But for our universe with its vanishingly rare, life-friendly character to be
the universe, to uniquely exist, looks awfully like the result of a choice of a
value — life, intelligent life — from among a vast, coincidence-defying
range of lifeless alternatives.4 In short, the existence and character of our
universe seem prima facie to be evidences of cosmic design.
This fine-tuning case for cosmic design thus depends inter alia upon:
P. a value peak in an appropriate state space (suggesting mind-
appropriateness or mind-affinity)
D. suitable vastness and low peak density of that state space (defy-
ing coincidental occupation)
U. unique (or near unique) occupation of that peak (suggesting
selection)5
The intuitive plausibility of such considerations — even to many with no
antecedent religious sympathies — poses something of a challenge to crit-
ics of design positions. Intuitively speaking, the challenge posed is one of
overcoming wildly prohibitive odds against a fine-tuned universe — such
as ours — by some means other than the obviously effective one of deliber-
ate choice and action of a creator.
II. Saturation
Although cosmic design has been denied on a variety of bases, I am inter-
ested here in many-worlds (or many-universe) arguments. Advocates of
such arguments are frequently perfectly willing to embrace the exquisite
appropriateness of our cosmos for life (a la P), and have no qualms over
acknowledging the utter vastness or even near infinitude of cosmological
state space and the sparseness of peaks (a la D). What they deny is U —
that only our cosmos is actual— suggesting instead that vastly many possi-
ble (or physically possible) universes do or in due “time” (whatever one
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takes that to mean in this context) will exist. The state space, on this view,
is saturated in that a cosmos does or will exist corresponding to every point
(or suitably many points) in the state space.
Exactly how is this supposed to deflate design inferences? The underly-
ing intuition is that the probability of eventually obtaining any specific one
of a given catalogue of possible outcomes can be elevated to nearly any
arbitrary level by a suitable number of tries, (nearly) regardless of the
degree of improbability of achieving that specific result on any single try.
If, so to speak, reality takes enough shots at generating varying universes,
eventually a fine-tuned one will turn up. Given, then, an extensive enough
array of actually existing universes (if, for instance, virtually every possible
universe is brought into existence), the existence of ours or any other will
seem unsurprising, and the existence of ours as opposed to some other one
will not be remarkable for the simple reason that the “as opposed to” will
simply not be true: uniqueness — and hence “picked-out-ness” — is
denied.
Arguments with this type of strategy for undercutting design inferences
— swamping some state space or subregion of a state space — I shall refer
to as saturation arguments. Such arguments are quite common (indeed, in
some form they go back at least to Democritus6) and saturation mecha-
nisms (or saturation algorithms) are appealed to in cosmology, biology,
physics, and other scientific areas (not to mention computer programming
and engineering).7
III. Some preliminary general cautions
Before getting immersed in the finer points of saturation and design, we
should note several science-relevant matters which will significantly
restrict the implications of saturation cases as specifically deployed in the
cosmic fine-tuning area.8 Most many-universe theories require that alter-
native universes be mutually inaccessible observationally (and even
causally).9 That empirical inaccessibility will pose some sticky problems
for Positivists, Popperians, and perhaps others concerning the scientific
legitimacy of many-universe theories.
Furthermore, that inaccessibility will mean that even the best case evi-
dential scenarios for such theories will be indirect and nearly vanishingly
insubstantial. The most plausible case would be evidence in our world con-
firming some theory either consistent with or implying the existence of
such other universes.10 But given the underdetermination of theory by
data, mere consistency constitutes only thin support, and (given the empiri-
cal inaccessibility of other worlds) for any theory with many universe
implications there would nearly trivially be an empirically equivalent theo-
ry without the massively counter-Ockham accoutrements.11
Alternatively, one might try to argue that the very improbability of our
universe constitutes evidence of multiple tries elsewhere — just as seeing
someone flip 100 successive heads might seem decent grounds for thinking
that that wasn’t their first attempt.12 But that argument works only if we
already know that we are dealing with a stochastic system—which is part
of what’s at issue in the first place.13
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In any case, it should not be forgotten that the entire catalogue of our
empirical evidence will consist of data from exactly one universe — one
which is in fact fine-tuned for life. That would seem prima facie to be an
unpromising starting point for an inferential case for the existence of infi-
nitely many other universes, the bulk of which lack precisely the fine-
tuned character of the sole observed cosmos.14
Furthermore, even if it should turn out that many-universe cosmological
theories do not fit well with design positions (and that remains to be seen),
the extent of the damage to design positions will be dependent upon the
empirical status of the relevant cosmological theories. But as A.R.
Peacocke says (in a lovely bit of understatement)
[I]t is salutary to remember that most cosmological theories are
under-determined by the facts and greatly influenced by mathemati-
cal considerations, from which quasi-aesthetic criteria are not entirely
absent.15
In other words, significant stretches of cosmological theorizing are built as
much on taste as upon data.
Finally, it is worth keeping in mind that in a purely Ockham competi-
tion, design would do quite nicely. As physicist Edward Harrison
remarks:
Take your choice: blind chance that requires multitudes of universes,
or design that requires only one.16
and Fred Hoyle, speaking of the laws of nuclear physics, cites as alterna-
tives
a deep-laid scheme [or] a monstrous sequence of accidents.17
Indeed, when it comes to many-universe theories, Ockham might be well
advised to bring along more than a mere razor — perhaps something more
like a chain saw.
IV. Some deeper saturation concerns
Let us now begin a closer look at cosmic saturation cases. One way to
overwhelm the relevant improbabilities would be simply to postulate the
existence of a multitude (or infinitely many or all) of the possible universes
— simply to assert their existence as a brute fact of reality. However, many
design critics find that approach unattractive because such bald postula-
tion seems unacceptably like free-floating metaphysical speculation rather
than a (desired) scientific challenge to design conclusions. What is hoped
for here is some purely natural mechanism which would through its own
normal, unsupervised operations produce the required array of universes.
Current hypothesized ‘scientific’ cosmic saturation mechanisms come in
several varieties. The first involves Hugh Everett’s many-worlds interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics, according to which each possible alternative
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at each quantum juncture is actually realized, each ‘world’ splitting at that
point into distinct paths, each path characterized by one of the alternative
values of the quantum event in question. The second involves John
Wheeler’s oscillating universe model, with a new universe (or family of
such) emerging out of each collapse of the preceding cycle. The third
involves Edward Tryon’s picture of universes being generated as quantum
bubbles out of vacuum non-homogeneities within a larger quantum vacu-
um domain. The fourth involves inflationary cosmologies, e.g., Andrei
Linde’s chaotic inflation model in which multiple independent, isolated,
and variant domains (“universes”) coalesce out of different symmetry
breakings in the early instants of cosmic inflation.
Each of these theories involves postulation of multiple ‘universes,’ the
relevant state-space of possible universes being at least partially — if not
ultimately completely — saturated with existing universes. Such satura-
tion is, again, taken to falsify U, thus purportedly destroying any prospect
of getting design mileage out of cosmic fine-tuning. Given the existence of
multitudes — even, according to some, an infinity — of universes, the exis-
tence of wildly improbable fine-tuning ceases to be surprising.18 (And, the
story continues, the fact that we see fine-tuning is an inconsequential conse-
quence of an inescapable anthropic observer selection effect.)
It must be noted, however, that in each of these scenarios universes are
generated not all simultaneously, but sequentially over time — perhaps
one at a time in the oscillation case, perhaps a closely allied family at each
successive instant in the Everett case, perhaps a continually emerging
unrelated multitude in the inflation and bubble cases. That means that the
set of possible universes is not complete at any given arbitrary instant and
indeed may never be. Thus:
P1: the constraint that the universe generation be science and not
metaphysics typically dictates sequential generation of universes,
implying chronic incompleteness in the set of universes.
This diachronic character is tacitly acknowledged by cosmologists’ talk of
mother and daughter universes.
But in order for the multitude of universes to rigorously undercut fine-
tuning design inferences, the collection of existing universes must be huge
(of at least an order of magnitude comparable to the improbability of the
fine-tuning), or even infinite or complete, and must also be broadly repre-
sentative of the range of possibilities represented in the cosmic state space
— since loops, merely local concentrations, etc., will defeat the saturation
strategy.19 Many-universe advocates tacitly admit as much by routinely
presuming the existence of an infinity of universes or of all possible uni-
verses. Thus:
P2: for many-universe scenarios to rigorously undercut design
requires that the collection of existing universes be comparatively
huge, or infinite, or complete, and that it be a broadly representative
sample.
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P1 and P2 obviously generate a tension, and with it a seeming problem for
anti-design cases that intuitively employ both.
V. Interlude: the Darwinian proposal
But this problem might be finessed by borrowing a page from Darwinian
evolution. A suitably structuredmechanical procedure which can ‘read’ and
take advantage of slopes and other topographic features to move through a
state-space in preferred directions — e.g., Darwinian selection in a fitness
space — can gradually and without any guidance whatsoever locate and
climb peaks of mountainous improbabilities. (That, at least, is the contention
of Richard Dawkins and others.) For instance, a biological species at some
point on a fitness slope tends, via selection processes, to move further up that
slope (given the availability of appropriate variations). Each point on the
slope becomes a platform for exploring the surrounding fitness topography
and for moving from that platform preferentially upward. An exploration
where each step is a modest departure from the previous one, where the pre-
vious position thus constitutes a constraint upon the location of the next step,
permits a system in effect to take advantage of its own past and to persist
along some selected fitness gradient. A search falling upon a slope can grad-
ually climb toward the peak, given the directionality of Darwinian selection
mechanisms. Such a state space search mechanism can move preferentially
up slopes and close in on peaks without needing to completely explore (or
saturate) the entire relevant (fitness) state space. In short, given a suitable
mechanism, P2might no longer hold, thus resolving the tensionwith P1.
VI. Cosmic evolution: potential technical difficulties
a. Absence of directional mechanism
But it is not at all obvious that in the cosmic case there is any suchmecha-
nism. It is unclear what constraints (if any) are imposed on a daughter uni-
verse by its mother universe. For instance, black holes are notoriously
alleged to be ‘bald’ and thus without any ‘memory’ — whether the black
hole is produced within one universe and out of which a daughter develops
or whether it results from the collapse of an entire universe in an oscillation.
In any case, the production mechanisms for universes in the popular many-
universe cosmologies have no selection mechanism (with the possible
exception of Smolin’s, which ‘selects’ for black hole production) and are not
directional. So even if there is a relevant gradient in the topography, the sys-
tem may well be unable to take advantage of it. With a directionally sensi-
tive search mechanism, landing close to a peak makes a difference. Absent
that sensitivity, landing close may be of no particular help at all, since the
next step (the next daughter universe) is much more likely to move farther
away from, than to move any closer to, the nearby fine-tuned peak.
b. State space topography.
But suppose that in the cosmic case there really were some mechanism
capable of recognizing and responding to fine-tuning gradients in the state
space. As it turns out, the existence of a slope-sensitive mechanism is not
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the only requirement. The constraints on parameters consistent with life-
permitting universes seem wildly tight and the windows correspondingly
tiny. That fact has consequences for the topography of cosmic state spaces:
i. relevant peaks will be widely scattered — peak density will be
extremely low
ii. peaks will be narrow and steep sided — ‘fitness’ slopes will be
extremely short
Those features will in turn have consequences for saturation searches as
follows.
i. Extremely low peak density. If there is an infinity of possible universes
and if peaks are widely scattered, the chances of either a random or a
slope-sensitive walk — or random scatter — hitting a peak in some speci-
fied time is just about exactly the same as a single shot hitting a peak.
Alternatively, given that such a walk would have to begin somewhere, the
chances of such a walk beginning from a place likely to lead to a peak in a
finite number of steps are again essentially the same as those of locating
such a peak by chance. If peak density is low enough that there are signifi-
cant stretches of the topography with no discernable slope, then a slope-
sensitive mechanism may afford no significant shortcut through the
improbabilities.
ii. Extremely short slopes. Steep-sided peaks mean that there will be few
outlying slopes to climb even if there were mechanisms capable of climb-
ing them. Indeed, depending upon the character of the requirements for
life-permitting universes (and when defining required limits, people occa-
sionally throw around powers of ten with the (negative) exponent outstrip-
ping the number of protons in the cosmos) such slopes may be nearly non-
existent. So even if Dawkins were correct that one could gradually climb
the slopes of a biological Mt. Improbable, even if there were universe-gen-
erators capable of climbing slopes, the absence of long cosmic slopes might
render all of that irrelevant here. But if that is so, then for prospects of suc-
cess in locating peaks via saturation to rise above sheer chance (the inade-
quacy of which was what prompted all this to begin with) such saturation
will need to tend toward the dense and global.
c. Degrees of saturation
What this seems to indicate is that to undercut cosmic design rigorously
via state space saturation, the saturation is going to have to be of a brute
force type — simply flooding the state space. And if universe production
is purely random and non-directional, then — depending on the details of
the mechanism (and details are not thick on the ground) — there will
inevitably be redundancies, and very possibly loops, cul de sacs, stalls,
quirks of probability, and other types of counter-productions — meaning
that significantly more universes than merely the number of possible uni-
verses (which on some tellings is itself infinite) will have to be generated in
order to guarantee existence of fine-tuned ones. That will require some
pretty robust mechanisms.
Yet, robust as the various proposed mechanisms might appear, they are
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sharply bounded. Standard versions of Everett’s theory generate hugely
many worlds, but (on most versions) none in which the fundamental
physics differs from ours. Thus, although there is significant saturation,
that saturation is only local, since worlds with fundamentally different
physics from ours are out of reach. Tryon’s view relies purely on random
bubble emergence and is thus unlikely to be dense. Furthermore, the bub-
bling is within the quantum vacuum style exhibited by our particular uni-
verse. Here again, universes with fundamentally different physics are not
to be expected.20 Wheeler’s and other oscillation views are not only non-
directional but are extremely incomplete in that any past sequence can con-
tain only closed worlds (sequences would stop at the first open world) and
— even more seriously limiting — can on some versions have gone
through no more than about 100 previous cycles.21 That is too few even to
register on any state space probability radar and thus returns the reality of
our particular sort of fine-tuned cosmos to essentially the initial level of
mystery.
The overall upshot here is that for both topographic and theoretical rea-
sons, the capabilities of current many-universe theories for locating fine-
tuning peaks in a cosmic state space may be significantly less robust than
usually assumed.
VII. Saturation: intended payoffs?
But suppose that all of that were simply waived, and that it were simply
granted that cosmic saturation mechanisms did have those capabilities typ-
ically assumed without argument. Would saturation have the implications
to which design critics typically help themselves? Among the tasks satura-
tion cases are supposed to perform are typically the following: (a) remov-
ing any presumption of specialness from our cosmos (‘Copernicanism’); (b)
explaining the existence of our exquisitely fine-tuned cosmos; and (c)
removing the starch from inferences to deliberate design based on fine-tun-
ing. All three inferences are, it seems to me, problematic. I shall only
briefly wave at the first two, then look at the third in a bit more detail.
a. Saturation and specialness
One intuition (and sometime intention) behind many-universe hypothe-
ses is that a flock of worlds will by its very existence remove any hint of
specialness from the world we inhabit, thereby disabusing us of any high
opinion of either ourselves or our world, and destroying even the appear-
ance of any need for anything conceptually extraordinary.22 For instance, in
a discussion of the (so-called) Copernican principal Adams and Laughlin
say the following:
The seeming coincidence that the universe has the requisite special
properties that allow for life suddenly seem much less miraculous if
we adopt the point of view that our universe … is but one of count-
less other universes. In other words, our universe is but one small
part of a multiverse… With the concept of the multiverse in place …
our universe has no special status within the vast cosmic melange of uni-
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verses that comprise our multiverse.23 [their emphasis]
It seems peculiar that the character of our universe — whose adjustment in
terms of life-permitting requirements is so exquisite that accounting for it
allegedly demands the assumption of existence of countless universes most
of which lack precisely that character — is supposed to be rendered unre-
markable by the mere existence of those other un-exquisite worlds. It is as
if the brilliance of a diamond were rendered unremarkable by the mere
existence of zillions of globs of congealed mud.24 (Along this general line, it
should be noted that if there are characteristics which indicate design inde-
pendent of improbability, then design cases constructed on those charac-
teristics will simply not be touched by saturation arguments.)
b. Saturation and explanation
i. explanatory lacunae
It is not exactly clear how explanation is to work here, even assuming that
many universe hypotheses are supposed to be explanatory. In the now-
standard firing squad analogy, if you survived a firing squad, even if there
were zillions of other firing squads and targets — making it likely that at
least some intended target or other survived — you would still want to
know the details of how you had come to be the survivor. Your survival is
not explained by the probabilities. And the existence — now non-existence
— of all the other less fortunate targets would not provide the slightest hint
of what brought about your survival — guns jamming, freak ballistics,
incompetent marksmen, defective shells, quantum mechanical tunnelling,
bribery or just your irresistible charm. It is no doubt lucky for you that you
are the survivor, but your surviving is not explained by appeal to luck. Luck
— if it meant anything — would just mean that you were selected despite
the causal factors (if any) which picked you out having no special link to
you, not being factors specially characteristic of or essential to you or for
which you can feel any special self-satisfaction. It would mean that you sur-
vived despite the near guarantee that were the process done again you
would lose.
On the other hand, if there were any grounds for thinking that some-
how you were special, or that you were in some sense privileged, it is not
clear how multiplying alternatives would erode that. One does not make
one’s personal luck in winning a lottery less amazing by increasing the
number of losing tickets. Nor does the number of losing tickets sold have
the slightest relevance to your winning if the lottery is rigged in your favor.
ii. regresses, short circuits, and circles
For a saturation argument to work, there must be a state space of possi-
bilities with some rather nicely adjusted properties of its own. And as John
Leslie once remarked, to work as advertised even the quantum vacuum
must have some “interesting specific characteristics.”25 Exactly where do
they come from, and what accounts for their appropriateness? Furthermore,
any sequential, ‘scientific’ saturation search of a cosmic state space requires
a mechanism — what Robin Collins calls a “universe generator” — which
presumably has requisites and constraints at least as tight as any of the
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individual universes it produces. An effective saturation search mecha-
nism (or algorithm) would thus seem to occupy a peak in a search mecha-
nism state space. Indeed, such a mechanism would itself seem to possess
exactly the characteristics (P,D, and U) whose suggestions of design it was
supposed to undercut. (As Ernan McMullin notes in a related context: “[I]t
is curious how the same challenge arises over and over …”26)
And, of course, not only must there be a state-space of the right sort, and
not only must there be a universe-generator of the right sort, but each must
be appropriately adjusted to the structure of the other.27 How postulating
such a tightly tuned mechanism represents explanatory progress while
appeal to a designer allegedly does not28 is not clear. There have been
attempts to claim that the delicate balance required for saturation cases
constitutes a necessity. If so, then it would be logically ‘free,’ and there
would be no alternatives from which it had to be picked. (This would be a
negative answer to Einstein’s question of whether God had a choice.) Of
course, theists have frequently made the parallel move — claiming that
God exists necessarily. And if the retreat to logical necessity is legitimate
for saturation, then surely it is so for design as well.
Attempting to account for the fine-tuning of a universe-generator itself
by another iteration of the same strategy — i.e., postulating a generator-
generator (a meta-generator) to avoid a designer at that level — seems to
invite a regress as well.29 In fact, if a meta-generator saturates a generator
state space, among the generators produced would presumably be one
geared to generating only fine-tuned universes without having to bother to
produce a huge contingent of untuned ones. Our observational evidence
— consisting of exactly one fine-tuned universe — would seem, especially
by Ockham’s standards, to support the existence of that sort of generator
and, consequently to support the conclusion that our fine-tuned universe
was the only universe there was — at least, in the universe of our hypothe-
sized universe-generator. The saturation outlook thus might, if pushed,
threaten to erode its ownmany-universe foundations.
iii. Saturation, design, and intent
First, brief preliminaries. In exploring the question of whether or not sat-
uration undercuts design theories, we should keep in mind that there does
not seem to be any fundamental logical problem. One could apparently
always consistently claim that God used some saturation mechanism to
produce the worlds He wanted. One could rule that out by specifying cer-
tain characteristics God must have and stipulating a type of saturation
which a being with those characteristics could not employ. That, of course,
is at least edging into theology, and should be recognized as such.
Many (or most) many-universe theories fundamentally involve random
processes, and one common intuition here is that randomness and intent
are incompatible. But it is not just obvious that randomness built into satu-
ration algorithms rules out design. We sometimes deliberately employ
randomness for certain purposes, and it has been argued (by e.g. Steven
Brams30) that in some cases employment of randomness is the optimal
rational strategy. Although I will not pursue this issue further here, I have
argued elsewhere that in specific cases even if we knew that matters were
676 Faith and Philosophy
in some scientific sense random, that would not completely settle the issue
of design.31
c. Intent vs. foresight
Informally, design typically involves the deliberate picking out of a
unique point (or path or region) in a state space, and a designer with an aer-
ial view of the topography can do that without a groping trial and error
approach, without hacking through nearly impenetrable probability thick-
ets.32 A thoroughly foresighted designer would not need to employ a satu-
ration search strategy, so if such strategies are what science uncovers in
nature, then are not design pictures thereby eroded?33
Perhaps not. We first need to separate foresight (or state space over-
sight) from issues of intent, decision, plan and the like. An adult who
recently recovered sight after being blind since infancy when asked about
major differences that sight made, remarked: “[I]f you drop something
you can find it.”34 That did not, of course, mean that without sight one had
no available rational search procedures whatever, but only that one in effect
was limited to saturation search procedures — e.g., that one simply had to
grope blindly, looking for the utterly isolated peak (one’s keys). But obvi-
ously, groping (perhaps systematically but still blindly) for something on
the floor does not in the slightest indicate lack of intelligence, intent, pur-
pose, or anything of the sort. In this case any approach other than a system-
atic saturation might be evidence of less than optimal rationality.
The point here is that employment of saturation procedures of this sort
has nothing inherently to do with presence or absence of design, decision,
purpose and so forth, although it might reveal various characteristics of
any agent employing such a procedure. A bat, observing a human groping
blindly for car keys on the floor of a totally dark cave, might reasonably
conclude a human inability to echolocate, but could not rightly conclude
absence of human cognition or purpose.
In fact, under some circumstances, employment of specific types of satu-
ration might even be evidence of intent, decision, and the like. Consider a
mouse seeking an exit from a maze. If the mouse is simply wandering
blindly about the maze, we are unlikely to revise our usual estimates of
mouse cognition. But suppose we discover that the mouse is absolutely
systematically and in sequence exploring every possible path in the maze.
This progressive and systematic saturation of the maze space would seem
to cry out for a higher-level intentional explanation. After observing that
behavior, we might even try to sneak another look at our kids’ video of
Stuart Little.
Beyond that, the makeup of the set of universes generated could also in
some cases constitute evidence of intent. Suppose, for instance, that it
turned out that a number of scattered pockets of the state-space were satu-
rated, a fine-tuned cosmos being contained in each pocket. Or suppose we
discovered that our fine-tuned cosmos was at the very center of the one
saturated portion of the cosmic state-space35, as if our world had been the
desired target, the surrounding worlds being actualized as an utterly
inconsequential side effect of the intent to actualize our fine-tuned world
—much as one might scoop up a handful of sand to get at the one brilliant
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grain one has spotted.36
In this connection we must remember that e.g., Tryon’s bubbles and
Linde’s domains themselves reside in some more basic megaverse,37 which
presumably had to be of enormous size and fecundity to produce a fine-
tuned domain/bubble by the procedures in question.38 Thus other existing
domains/bubbles might be of the type and number one would expect to see
if behind the megaverse was precisely an intent to end up with at least one
fine-tuned cosmos.39 Here is a simple analogy. If someone’s intent was to
toss 10 heads in succession, what we could reasonably expect to see would
include a huge number of tosses which did not display 10 heads in succes-
sion. That would hardly establish either that there was no operative intent
or that the intent was not 10 successive heads.40
It is thus obvious that mere presence of saturation does not necessarily
undercut design, intent, purpose, choice and/or agency.41 Indeed, the
design critic faces a dilemma here. If the other alleged universes are com-
pletely empirically inaccessible, appeals to many-universe theories against
design no longer seem particularly scientific, but seem to be little more than
philosophical (or anti-religious) preference. But if the other alleged uni-
verses are empirically accessible, there are no good a priori reasons for
thinking that the character of the saturation — once empirically deter-
mined — will turn out to militate against design. Present anti-design
claims might thus be little more than hopes based (again) upon philosophi-
cal (or anti-religious) preferences.42
d. Searchers, search algorithms and mechanisms
The fact that we humans deliberately employ saturation strategies is sig-
nificant. Years ago students learning computer programming were taught
how to write bubble-sort programs for ordering collections into specified
sequences. As it turns out, a bubble-sort is simply a state space search
employing a particular saturation process. (More recently, genetic algo-
rithms, evolutionary computing, simulated annealing algorithms and simi-
lar approaches to various problems have become all the rage. They too are
simply subspecies of saturation strategies for exploring specific state spaces
in search of specific peaks.) Of course, bubble-sorts were not employed
because of any human inability to enumerate or alphabetize lists.
That suggests the following distinction. A designer seeking, for
instance, a biological fitness peak in a fitness space might follow some evo-
lutionary path, making specific decisions at each node, selecting directions
from among the alternatives presented at that node. Or the designer might
construct a mechanism programmed to make specified sorts of ‘decisions’
at each evolutionary node, allowing the mechanism to seek the desired
solution while the designer pursued other interests. We must thus distin-
guish between a search itself being directly intelligently prosecuted ‘on the
ground’ and a search mechanism (or algorithm) being intelligently
designed, then turned loose in a state-space to run mechanically on its
own. Given those two possibilities, it is evident that discovery that some
search procedure is mechanically prosecuted does not yet remove
prospects for design.43
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e. Saturation and designers
Employment of saturation strategies, it is often claimed, does tell us
something about the employing agent’s abilities (think of e.g., Dawkins’s
blind watchmaker). But does it? Not always very powerfully. Recall the
bubble-sort program. Programmers employed that not because people
were unable to order numbers sequentially, or to alphabetize lists (often
nearly by inspection), but simply because people found it less than fasci-
nating and didn’t want to have to bother with it. Let someone (or some
thing) else do it. But surely, an omniscient being wouldn’t need to employ
such means, but would know instantaneously and easily the best cosmos,
the best developmental path, or whatever, and there would thus be no
process of discovery to be distasteful in the way that our hand-sorting
processes can be. Perhaps. But on the other hand, such a being might
enjoy watching some really exquisitely designed saturation search mecha-
nism exploring a state space. Without getting involved in theology here,
we just wouldn’t know. We often get intellectual satisfaction out of seeing
something we’ve designed work like that. Maybe G. K. Chesterton was on
to something when he suggested that the reason the sun comes up every
morning is that God loves seeing it happen, and with a kind of enduring
enthusiasm we humans usually grow jadedly out of, every morning says
“Do it again.”44 Lack of relevant ability simply isn’t on the horizon here.
Of course it might be suggested that although restricted ability does not
follow, that God for various reasons wouldn’t use such an inefficient, prodi-
gal means as saturation. But I see little reason to accept that assumption,
especially involving as it does speculative, unstated, and unsupported for-
ays into the mind and tastes of a cosmic designer.45 Again, critics of design
have here strayed into an area in which many of them are not particularly
qualified to speak authoritatively— theology.
IX. Conclusion
Saturation arguments have come to be widely taken as undercutting
design perspectives.46 But things are not that straightforward. Saturations
themselves are more demanding than is sometimes acknowledged, and the
implications of those very demands may themselves in turn suggest design
and intent. And saturations as such do not imply the absence of decision,
intent, purpose and the like. It can be plausibly argued that they at most
undercut presumptions of aerial overviews and foresight. And even that
consequence is less secure than it might appear once one distinguishes
active searches and automatically operating search mechanisms. But even
without that distinction, claims that design is actually undercut by satura-
tion are problematic. Cosmic design is not just a view unsupported by any-
thing other than the inertia of religiously-based traditions, now in forced
retreat fighting a purely ad hoc rearguard action. Whatever the ultimate
outcome of present cosmological debates, fine tuning arguments are not
simply moves of desperation. Design is attractive to many people in part
precisely because of the empirical character of the cosmos around us. Even
Darwin, in his last year, admitted that the impression of design in nature
still sometimes came over him with “overwhelming force.”47 Subsequent
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discovery of increasingly persistent fine-tuning on an unexpected scale and
of a seemingly astonishing order, has done nothing to erode that attraction.
In fact, the willingness of those who find design repugnant to dismiss intu-
itive perceptions of design the power of which even Darwin acknowl-
edged, and to embrace such empirically tenuous and massive repudiations
of Ockham as to multiply universes nearly beyond imagination, may itself
be the real symptom of desperation.48
Finally, if some find it a puzzle that even one universe should be gener-
ated (and that is what lies behind the traditional question: why is there
something rather than nothing?), the fact that billions of universes (or even
all of them) might be generated should probably not be seen as any less
puzzling. But even if multiplication of universes does in fact reduce puz-
zlement, that reduction may not necessarily go the direction opponents of
teleology hope. Again, G.K.Chesterton:
So one elephant having a trunk was odd; but all elephants having
trunks looked like a plot.49
Perhaps a similar principle applies to all universes having actuality.
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NOTES
1. I am grateful to David Van Baak, Lydia McGrew, Tim McGrew, and to
Kelly Clark and my other colleagues in the Calvin College Philosophy
Department for helpful discussion of an earlier draft.
2. Lists range everywhere from six to over seventy five depending on
who is counting.
3. I have done so elsewhere — see Nature, Design and Science (Albany:
SUNY, 2001)
4. Some may object to saying that this cosmos looks designed, but it at
least seems clear that a product of design might very well look like this cosmos
does.
5. I have not attempted to state these rigorously, and some qualifications
will obviously be required. For instance, John Leslie argues in effect that theD
density condition need apply only in the vicinity surrounding a relevant peak
— not in the state space as a whole. Universes, pp. 17-18 (NY: Routledge, 1989).
6. Democritus is represented as holding that:
[T]here are innumerable worlds, which differ in size. In some worlds
there is no sun and moon, in others they are larger than in our world,
and in others more numerous. The intervals between the worlds are
unequal; in some parts there are more worlds, in others fewer; some are
increasing, some at their height, some decreasing; in some parts they are
arising, in others failing. ...There are some worlds devoid of living crea-
tures or plants or any moisture. [G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven, and M. Schofield,
The Presocratic Philosophers, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1983), para
565, p. 418.]
7. Least-action theories again provide one nice example. Such theories
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were regarded with suspicion by some physicists because they appeared to
have such a strong air of teleology. For many, that suspicion was allayed by
Feynman’s sum-over-histories suggestion that light rays, etc. by quantum
mechanical means simultaneously sample all available paths, then ‘choose’ the
path which turns out to be that requiring (in this case) least time to traverse. In
terms to be introduced shortly, that sampling is a global, dense (probably syn-
chronic) saturation of path state-space, the one exhibiting a peak minimum
being actualized. Ironically, Maupertuis may have seen least-action principles
as in effect saturation principles designed specifically to locate optima. Doubly
ironic, Feynman’s proposal is itself viewed by some as teleologically flavored.
See Barrow and Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, (NY: Oxford, 1986)
p. 66 and p. 152.
Something like saturation arguments also frequently arise in origin of life
discussions in the form of appeal to multiple varying planets as a way of cir-
cumventing probability issues — see e.g., Michael Hart, “Atmospheric
Evolution” Ch 17, Extraterrestrials: where are they? ed. Hart and Ben
Zuckerman, (NY: Pergamon, 1982). And a von Neumann machine exploration
of the cosmos would be a saturation search. Indeed, in a longer version of this
paper I argue that Darwinian evolution is a modified saturation argument.
8. Although in both contemporary cosmology and contemporary biology,
saturation is taken as counting prima facie against design, intent and purpose,
that has not always been the perceived inferential direction. Historically, the
cosmos was taken to be a plenum, to embody a plenitude, to exhibit a great
and unbroken chain of being. That every possible niche was filled with the
appropriate entity was taken as a manifestation of grand design. That view
may have been seriously mistaken, but the lesson is that the proposed princi-
ple that saturation implies absence of design is not just an obvious truth of rea-
son and indeed has not always been perceived as truth of any sort. Joseph
Zycinski has also commented on the similarity between plenitude and many
universe theories. See “The Weak Anthropic Principle and the Design
Argument” p. 127, Zygon, vol. 31, no. 1, March 1996, pp. 115-130.
9. Martin Rees thinks that there might be some indirect empirical accessi-
bility. See “Prologue,” Our Cosmic Habitat (Princeton: Princeton, 2001). David
Deutsch suggests that quantum paradoxes can perhaps be understood in terms
of particles actually interacting across worlds. And Lee Smolin discusses the
possibility that successive generations of fermions could constitute “fossils of
earlier universes” “Did the Universe Evolve?” pp. 188-9, Classical and Quantum
Gravitation vol. 9, no. 1, January 1992, pp. 173-91.
10. For instance, Everett’s view was a response to Schrodinger’s cat puz-
zles, and inflationary theories were responses in part to the observed apparent
absence of monopoles. Such theories might thus be considered empirical in a
broad sense. In this connection, John Leslie says:
Strong evidence for something … is whatever causes a puzzlement
which the existence of that something would reduce or remove …
[Universes, p. 194]
It may be noted, however, that there are some who hold the controversial
position that Everett’s many-worlds interpretation is required by quantum
mechanics itself.
11. Of course that does not guarantee that any such empirically equivalent
theory would be conceptually or explanatorily very satisfactory. Craig’s
Theoremwould suggest that.
12. Leslie makes a related point inUniverses, p. 142 ff.
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13. This inference turns out to be quite tricky. See e.g. Roger White’s “Fine
Tuning andMultiple Universes,” p. 263,Nous, Vol. 34, No. 2 (2000) 260-276.
14. Should we acquire either theoretical or observational reason to think
that life in fact could occur under a huge range of circumstances, then at least
fine-tuning would be basically falsified. (This is parallel to the position defend-
ed by H. B. Nielson in Particle Physics Andric, Lodic, and Zovko (ed)
Dordrecht, 1981). Leslie argues this in several places — e.g., “The Anthropic
Principle Today” p. 180.
15. Creation and the World of Science (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979), p. 73. And
McMullin characterizes cosmology as “a precarious enterprise [which] requires
a long stretch beyond the relatively safe routines of inductive science,” p. 360,
“Indifference Principle and Anthropic Principle in cosmology,” Studies in
History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 24, no. 3, 1993, pp. 359-89. The status of
cosmological theories is sometimes put less politely — for instance that there
is, in order, speculation, wild speculation and cosmology. Peacocke’s reference
to aesthetics is nicely borne out by Joseph Zycinski’s report that
M.A. Markov claims that this very idea [of an infinite hierarchy of semi-
closed worlds] remains so attractive from a mathematical point of view
that one should develop it regardless of its correspondence with any
physical data.
“The Weak Anthropic Principle and the Design Argument,” p. 127, Zygon
vol. 31, no. 1, 1996, pp. 115-130.
16. Masks of the Universe p. 252
17. This is on p. 64 of Hoyle’s untitled contribution (pp. 55-66) to Religion
and the Scientists, Mervyn Stockwood (ed) (London: SCM, 1959).
18. Brandon Carter, in his “Large Number Coincidences and the Anthropic
Principle in Cosmology” defines a world ensemble as “an ensemble of univers-
es characterized by all conceivable combinations of initial conditions and fun-
damental constants . . .” (quoted in Leslie, p. 138). Leslie, however, says that
Carter should not be read literally here. Collins and Hawking refer to “not one
universe but a whole infinite set of universes with all possible initial condi-
tions.” C.B. Collins and S. Hawking, p. 319, “Why is the Universe Isotropic?”
Astrophysical Journal 180, 317-334, 1973. See also G. Ellis and G Brundrit, “Life
in the Infinite Universe.” Quarterly Journal of the Royal Astronomical Society, vol.
20, 1979, pp. 37-41.
19. For related reasons, Leslie suggests that workable means of producing
varying universes will tend to be fundamentally probabilistic. See “The
Scientific Weight of Anthropic and Teleological Principles,” pp. 116-117, in
Current Issues in Teleology, pp. 111-119, Nicholas Rescher (ed) (Lanham: UPA,
1986). Of course, if a rare fine-tuned universe turned up among the first few
generated, we’d likely be suspicious of the mechanism being really random
and unguided after all.
20. Linde says that in his chaotic inflation scenario, in different domains
“scalar fields take different values, and ... therefore, different laws of physics
operate.” (“The Universe: inflation out of chaos” New Scientist, vol 105 #1446,
7 Mar 1985, pp. 14-18.) It seems to me, however, that on the most fundamental
level, the physics would still be the same across domains.
21. That is Joseph Silk’s position. The Big Bang, pp. 311-12, (San Francisco:
Freeman, 1980). Some others, however, contend that our cosmos has already
gone through infinitely many such cycles — without, apparently, having ever
stumbled into an open configuration, despite the fact that theories based on
quantum field principles presumably would be subject to the principle that
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“every phenomenon that could happen in principle actually does happen occa-
sionally on a statistically random basis.” At least in some quantum bubble
views, any universe emerging as such a bubble could not (for energy conserva-
tion reasons) be open. Oscillation views have also been criticized on second-
law grounds involving the low entropy initial state required by life-permitting
universes such as ours. See Robin Collins “A Scientific Argument for the
Existence of God: The fine-tuning design argument,” pp. 63-4, in Michael
Murray, Reason for the Hope Within, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), pp. 47-75.
22. I think that McMullin has made a convincing case that one deep issue is
something like the Copernican principle. Of course, our world evidently is
very special — not just any old world would seem to require zillions of other
universes to counterbalance its specialness.
23. Fred Adams and Greg Laughlin, Five Ages of the Universe, pp. 199, 201.
(NY: Free Press, 1999).
24. Intuitions get a bit loopy here. That we observers are in a fine-tuned
universe is clearly not just a matter of astonishing luck — as if we could have
failed to find ourselves in a fine-tuned universe. If there are observers at all —
us or any other — to find themselves anywhere, it will be in a fine-tuned uni-
verse. Thus that we qua observers find ourselves in such isn’t so surprising.
But there being such a universe for there to be an us to find ourselves in, can be
surprising. And even once there is such a universe, that we specifically are
among those in existence — out of all the possible individuals — can be a legit-
imate source of amazement as well. Zillions of uninhabitable worlds clearly do
not help on that count. Indeed, if Gould is right that even this world wouldn’t
produce humans — let alone any of us — if the tape were run again, then even
a saturation exclusively of worlds like this one might not help. White makes a
related point inWhite, ibid. pp. 268-9.
25. Paul Davies refers to the vacuum as “nature’s miraculous jar of energy”
(Ch. 12, Superforce). And as John Polkinghorne has remarked: “the quantum
vacuum is a hive of activity.”
26. This fact emerges in various ways in various proposals. McMullin
quotes Guth and Steinhardt as follows:
Unfortunately the necessary slow-rollover transition requires the fine
tuning of parameters [notably the energy-density, the quantity which
occasioned the apparent need for fine-tuning in the original Big Bang
model]; calculations yield reasonable predictions only if the parameters
are assigned values in a narrow range. Most theorists (including both of
us) regard such fine tuning as implausible. The consequences of the sce-
nario are so successful, however, that we are encouraged to go on in the
hope that we may discover realistic versions of grand unified theories in
which such a slow-rollover transition occurs without fine tuning.
[explanatory insertion is McMullin’s]
Ernan McMullin, p. 385, “Indifference Principle and Anthropic Principle in
Cosmology,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 24 no. 3, 1993, p.
359-389.
27. Robin Collins has frequently made points of this sort. See e.g., Collins,
ibid. p. 61.
28. Dawkins has asserted that to appeal to a designer is “cowardly and dis-
honest.” (Lecture: “Unweaving the Rainbow.”)
29. Another comment by Leslie is telling here as well:
Even when a Grand Unified Theory is selected cunningly to achieve the
SATURATION, WORLD ENSEMBLES, & DESIGN 683
desired results — which ... can look suspiciously like the ‘fine tuning’
which the inflationary hypothesis is so often praised for rendering unnec-
essary — you may still be forced to postulate a gigantic space containing
rare regions in which inflation of the right type occurs. [Universes p. 30]
George Gale states a Super Strong Anthropic Principle:
the ensemble of all universes must have those properties which allow life
to develop within it at some stage in its history,
and notes that it too generates a regress. “Anthropic-Principle Cosmology:
Physics or metaphysics?” p. 207, in Final Causality in Nature and Human Affairs
Richard Hassing (ed) (Washington D.C.: Catholic University, 1997), p. 188-210.
30. Superior Beings p. 145ff. In a related vein, Barrow and Tipler seem to be
committed to an ontological determinism (Anthropic Cosmological Principle p.
138), yet still say:
It is often the case that complex phenomena are better described by sta-
tistical laws in which chance is fundamental. [p. 139]
31. See my “Design, Chance, and Theistic Evolution.” Beyond that, even
pure chance with only one outcome per node does not by itself undercut
design, since such a process would produce a single, linear path, for which an
argument could be made that it was the optimal path. It is only the (at least
provisional) exploration of multiple paths — i.e., some type of saturation —
that erodes design, if anything does.
32. A designer overviewing the state-space does not so much defy the prob-
abilities which prevented realization of the relevant phenomenon by chance, as
to simply render probabilistic considerations irrelevant. Here is an analogy.
Suppose that a huge number of people are flipping coins, and that one of them
gets 100H in succession. The fact that other people were flipping does not
change the odds or the mechanism of that one successful case — there is noth-
ing necessarily magical in the sheer existence of vastly many other independent
and disconnected flippers. (It does, of course, affect the probability that some one
or other got 100H in succession.) After the fact of the flips, it would be easy to
pick out the special successful case, but prior to the fact, there would be no rele-
vant observable difference that would allow one to pick that special case.
Of course, an omniscient being having foreknowledge could pick the one
case — the one that was going to be successful — and could simply dismiss the
other potential flippers before the process began. Their absencewould be irrele-
vant to the special case, and need not change the prior truth that the special flip-
per would succeed. (Actually, the possible relevance of unrealized counterfac-
tual matters is not so simple a matter as it might at first appear. See my unpub-
lished God, Freedom and Plantinga (dissertation).) What would be required for
this maximal efficiency would be foreknowledge — the ability to see over the
relevant topography and pick the special case. (As Dawkins remarks in Blind
Watchmaker, p. 5, “A true watchmaker has foresight. …”) This is roughly paral-
lel to design ability — the ability to overview the topography and to pick out
the desired peaks while effectively ignoring the rest of the landscape. The huge
odds against the individual case would be irrelevant unless one knows indepen-
dently that no creator had that prior ability, or unless one knows that all other
cases were in some sense actual. And even on many universe theories, how are
we to know of the existence of worlds empirically inaccessible in principle?
33. And again, determining the character of any cosmic saturationwill be prob-
lematic, given the inaccessibility of every single one of the alternative universes.
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34. Michael Abrams. “Sight Unseen,” Discover, June 2002, volume 23, 6, p.
59.
35. Leslie argues in effect that the greater the distance from the minimum
values of various life-permitting requirements, the less likely that it was done
by chance. “The Anthropic Principle Today,” p. 180 in Final Causality in Nature
and Human Affairs (Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy Vol 30), pp.
163-187, Richard Hassing (ed) Washington D.C.: Catholic University, 1997.
Robin Collins has explored some implications of finding our world near the
edge of life-permitting physical values.
36. We might call this the Woldring Principle. My friend Henk Woldring
was at a gathering at a friend’s house, and spotted a girl he did not know but
desperately wanted to get to know. On the spot, he announced a party at his
house the following weekend to which everyone there was invited — thereby
ensuring seeing the girl again at the cost of having to host the entire group. ( It
worked— they are nowmarried.)
37. Virginia Trimble has suggested that all relevant universes could be
“embedded in five (or higher) dimensional space, existing simultaneously,
from the point of view of a five (or higher) dimensional observer.”p. 85,
“Cosmology: man’s place in the universe,” American Scientist, vol 65, 1977, pp.
76-86. See also Leslie, Universes, p. 211 n. 18. Tryon, in “Is the universe a vacu-
um fluctuation,” (Nature, vol 246 #543, Dec 14, 1973, p. 396-7) simply refers to
“the vacuum of some larger space in which our Universe is embedded.”
38. Indeed, at least according to Barrow, Linde’s cosmology requires an
infinite megaverse at the very outset. See John Barrow, The World within the
World (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), p. 372 note.
39. A. R. Peacocke, in Creation and the World of Science takes chance and ran-
domness to be “creative agents” (p. 70) and sees chance as a divine “search
radar” (p. 95). Indeed, he holds that Einstein in his famous “dice” remark got
things precisely backwards. See also Ian Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science
(SF: Harper, 1990), p. 138.
40. This is suggested by remarks of Errol Harris in his Cosmos and
Anthropos, pp. 11-14, (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities, 1991), and Leslie
(Universes, p. 9) makes a similar point.
41. It is sometimes claimed that saturation does not positively refute agency
(purpose, etc.) of any sort, but that it does render agency (etc.) superfluous. It
should be kept in mind, however, that the claimed superfluousness does not
come free — it has a price tag of zillions of whole universes. See again
Harrison and Hoyle’s earlier statements. In any case, some things, it is clear,
could not come to exist apart from agency — at least in any reasonable sense of
‘could.’ Diesel bulldozers are one example. We just don’t know whether or
not a cosmos could come to exist independently of a creative agent (much less
a universe generator). Claims of superfluousness simply assume that they can
— with, so far as I know, very little warrant beyond an antipathy to design or
agency at least on the part of some.
42. As between many universes and design, Peter van Inwagen says that
fine-tuning evidence can take us only to the point where “[t]here is perhaps
nothing more that the metaphysician can say about this question except to
point out that each of these positions is emotionally attractive to certain peo-
ple” Metaphysics (Boulder: Westview, 1993), p. 146. McMullin quotes Guth as
saying: “I must admit that questions of plausibility are not logically deter-
minable and depend somewhat on intuition” McMullin, p. 383.
43. The evidential implications of the specific character of variant satura-
tions are different in these two contexts. Saturation might be evidence against a
direct inspection search (and creation), but might (depending on the character of
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rithm or mechanism. Although I will not explore that issue, here is just one
consideration. In the active search case, the smaller the region of the state space
explored prior to locating the peak, the more likely the searcher has access to
an overview of that space. On the other hand, it might be argued that the more
exhaustive and thorough the search procedure is — in short, the greater the
region of state space the procedure would completely saturate in its normal
application — the more likely the algorithm to be designed. An overview
allows an economy of search resources and an elegance of solution, but in the
absence of concerns for economy or elegance, thoroughness at least provides
assurance of results (if any are to be had).
44. “Ethics of Elfland” inOrthodoxy, (NY: Doubleday, 1990) p. 108.
45. Inferences to design in this area may be equally problematic. For any
path in a state-space one could, of course, hypothesize a specific sort of intelli-
gent agent who would plausibly bring about exactly that path. Consequently,
it is a bit dangerous — and perhaps a bit too easy —making design inferences,
giving design explanations, identifying likely relevant peaks, and so forth
except in special circumstances (e.g., cognitive content cases). But we do have
a least a tentative toehold in that we are very familiar with at least one sort of
intelligence — human. Beyond that, by declaring humans to be created in
God’s image, Christian theology suggests that there is a significant similarity of
sort and in some degree between God’s mind and our own.
46. John Casti in discussing the “Initial State Paradox” lists many-universe
theories, dissipation, inflation and God as the chief alternative explanations.
Despite describing the latter as “clearly the most straightforward” he nonethe-
less opts for the first. Paradigms Lost (New York: William Morrow, 1989), p.
482-91.
47. See Argyll, His Grace the Duke of, “What is Science?” p. 236-245 in
Good Words, April 1885, p. 244.
48. Appeal to the Anthropic Principle has itself been attributed to despera-
tion.
49. “Ethics of Elfland” inOrthodoxy p. 106-7 (NY: John Lane, 1908).
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